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One-Man Personal Service Corporations: Singing a
New Foglesong
Doing business in the corporate form offers the corporation's
shareholders and employees many advantages, including limited lia-
bility, tax advantages, and employee fringe benefits.1 Professionals
have attempted to obtain these advantages by forming personal serv-
ice corporations pursuant to state law.2 The Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service (Commissioner) has attacked the status of
these corporations from their inception. Only after litigating the is-
sue for almost a decade, did the Commissioner acquiesce 3 and finally
agree to recognize these professional corporations as true
corporations.
Despite this acquiescence, the Commissioner has continued his
attack on professional corporations using an indirect approach. The
Commissioner has used three methods to bypass or ignore the corpo-
ration: the sham corporation theory,4 the assignment-of-income doc-
trine,5 and Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 482.6 By using
these methods individually or collectively, the Commissioner has at-
tempted to attribute the corporation's income to the individual.
This note examines the plight of one-man personal service cor-
porations and explains how they may have won the battle against the
Commissioner and found a refuge after Fog/esong IV. 7 Part I reviews
the sham corporation and assignment-of-income theories and ex-
plains why their use to the Commissioner in attacking many one-
man personal service corporations is limited. Part II examines Code
section 482, the Commissioner's most powerful weapon yet, and dis-
1 H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS EN-
TERPRISES § 68-76 (2d ed. 1970).
2 Id. at § 77.
3 Rev. Rul. 101, 1970-1 C.B. 278.
4 See notes 11-27 infra and accompanying text.
5 See notes 28-55 infra and accompanying text.
6 I.R.C. § 482 (1976). See notes 56-102 inrfra and accompanying text.
7 Foglesong v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976) (Fog/esong 1), rev'd and re-
manded, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980) (Foglesong II), opinion on remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981)(Fo-
glesong 111), rev'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982) (Foglesong IV). It is important to
note that personal service corporations can be composed of one or many professionals. This
note will deal primarily with one-man personal service corporations since these corporations
have received most of the Commissioner's wrath. One-man personal service corporations
truly test the corporation fiction to its limit.
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cusses this section's debilitation by Foglesong IV. Part III examines
Code section 269A and demonstrates how this new section will elimi-
nate many personal service corporations. Part IV analyzes section
482's interpretation by the courts and shows that the Foglesong IV
court reached the proper result.
I. Original IRS Approaches for Attacking Personal Service
Corporations
Initially, the Commissioner used the common law doctrines of
sham corporation and assignment-of-income to attack personal serv-
ice corporations. The sham corporation doctrine disregards, for tax
purposes, the corporation that nominally earned income and requires
that income be taxed directly to the employee-owner.8 The assign-
ment-of-income doctrine voids, for tax purposes, an anticipatory as-
signment of income to someone other than the person earning it; it
thereby requires that the assignor be taxed on such income.9 Earlier,
the Commissioner had used these judicially created doctrines in tan-
dem.10 Recently, however, the Commissioner has practically aban-
doned the sham corporation argument and has instead concentrated
on the assignment-of-income doctrine.
A. The Sham Corporation Theoy
The Commissioner first attempted to use the sham corporation
theory in Fox v. Commissioner 1 and Laughton v. Commissioner.12 The
Commissioner argued that the personal service corporations involved
should have been disregarded for tax purposes because they were
"mere dummies"' 3 or "alter egos"' 14 of the individual taxpayers. In
both cases, however, the Board of Tax Appeals (Board) refused to
disregard the corporate entity.
In Fox, the taxpayer contracted to work for his personal service
corporation in exchange for a salary.' 5 The corporation's earnings
8 See D. KAHN, BAsIc CORPORATE TAXATION § 1.6 (3d ed. 1981).
9 See id.
10 See Fox v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938). See also notes 15-19, 39-43 infra and
accompanying text.
11 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938).
12 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939), remanded, 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940).
13 37 B.T.A. at 276.
14 40 B.T.A. at 105.
15 In Fox, a newspaper cartoonist formed a personal service corporation and contracted
to work exclusively for this corporation. Fox also assigned other contracts for his cartoons to
the corporation and received a weekly salary. The corporation then contracted with a syndi-
cate to distribute Fox's cartoons. 37 B.T.A. at 272-76.
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were significantly larger than Fox's salary. The Commissioner ar-
gued that the corporation was a "mere dummy" and should thus be
ignored for tax purposes.' 6 He therefore contended that the corpora-
tion's reported income should be allocated to Fox.
The Board of Tax Appeals rejected the Commissioner's conten-
tion, citing New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering.t 7 In New Colonial Ice, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that a corporation and a
shareholder are separate entities that should be disregarded only in
exceptional circumstances.' 8 The Board in Fox was impressed by the
corporate formalities observed, the separateness of Fox and the cor-
poration, and the corporation's recognition by third parties.' 9
In Laughton,20 a motion picture actor contracted to work exclu-
sively for the personal service corporation he had formed to act as his
manager and personal representative. The corporation's earned in-
come far exceeded the taxpayer's weekly salary.21
The Commissioner, contending that the corporation was only
the taxpayer's "agent and alter ego," 22 argued that the Board should
look through the corporate form and allocate the corporation's in-
come to Laughton.2 3 However, the Board of Tax Appeals again rec-
ognized the corporation and the individual as separate entities and
refused to disregard the corporate entity.
The United States Supreme Court severely limited the Commis-
sioner's sham corporation argument in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner.2 4 The Court stated that "the doctrine of corporate entity fills
16 Id. at 276. The Commissioner also relied on the assignment-of-income doctrine. See
notes 39-43 infra and accompanying text.
17 292 U.S. 435 (1934). In New Colonialke, a new corporation took over all of an older
business's assets. The new corporation then attempted to deduct the losses that the old corpo-
ration had incurred. The Court disallowed the attempted deduction because the two corpo-
rations were separate and distinct. The Court added that the substantial identity between
the two corporations' shareholders did not destroy that distinctness. Id. at 441-42.
18 For an example of a case presenting "exceptional circumstances," see Roubik v. Com-
missioner, 53 T.C. 365 (1969). Roubik is discussed at note 31 infra.
19 The Board stated that the personal service corporation's separate identity had been
generally respected by Fox and had been recognized by all who had dealt with it. 37 B.T.A.
at 277.
20 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939), remanded, 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940).
21 Id. at 102-05.
22 Id. at 105.
23 Id.
24 319 U.S. 436 (1943). In Moline Properties, an individual taxpayer transferred some
properties to a corporation organized for this purpose. The corporation assumed and agreed
to pay the mortgages on these properties. A few years later, the corporation sold the proper-
ties at a gain. The Commissioner challenged the taxpayer's attempt to include the gain on his
[February 1983]
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a useful purpose in business life."' 25 Consequently, courts must recog-
nize a corporate entity if either a substantial business purpose exists
in forming a corporation or the corporation carries on a business af-
ter its formation.2 6
Thus, the sham corporation argument has been severely cur-
tailed and will apply only in extreme situations. Generally, one-man
personal service corporations have avoided the sham corporation ar-
gument quite easily by strictly following corporate formalities. Nev-
ertheless, the Commissioner continues to use the sham argument.2 7
B. The Assignment-of-Income Doctrine
Under the assignment-of-income doctrine, income is allocated to
the person who truly earned it.28 Determining the "true" earner,
however, is often difficult.29 -Because this determination can be espe-
cially difficult 30 when the assignment-of-income doctrine is applied
to one-man personal service corporations, courts have often blurred
the sham corporation and assignment-of-income theories together.31
income tax return. The Supreme Court agreed with the Commissioner and held that the
corporation was not a sham. Thus, the corporation had to report the gain.
25 Id. at 438.
26 Id. at 438-39.
27 See, e.g., Oginoy v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900
(1980).
28 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
29 When income is split between a corporation and an individual taxpayer, our gradu-
ated income tax system is undermined. See note 32 infra.
30 See, e.g., American Say. Bank v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 828, 839 (1978). Two taxpay-
ers owned a corporation that sold insurance policies (through outside agents) and provided
management services (through the taxpayers). The Commissioner, relying on the assignment-
of-income doctrine, attempted to allocate the income from both the insurance sales and the
management services to the taxpayers. The court noted that, under the assignment-of-income
doctrine, it is often difficult to determine the "true" earner of income, especially when
[the] tax laws. . . permit the conceptually difficult arrangement where an individ-
ual performs services thereby earning the income that is received and the next day
performs the same services and the compensation, when paid to a corporation whol-
ly owned by that individual, is said to have been earned by the corporation.
Id. at 839. The Tax Court held that the Commissioner could allocate only the management
services income to the individual taxpayers. Id. at 842-43.
31 Roubik v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 365 (1969), illustrates how the assignment-of-income
and sham corporation doctrines have been used loosely and sometimes incorrectly. Four radi-
ologists who had previously engaged in individual practices formed a personal service corpo-
ration. Despite entering into an employment agreement with the corporation, each
continued his separate practice. The corporation entered no contracts; owned no equipment,
office, or medical supplies; and paid no rent or salaries, except to the taxpayers. The corpora-
tion merely maintained a set of records in which corporate income and deduction items were
entered. Id. at 379.
The Tax Court held that the corporation's reported income should be allocated to the
NOTES
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In addition, courts have found that this application raises a conflict
between two important tax policies: (1) the graduated income tax
system 32 and (2) the concept of a corporation as a separate taxable
entity.3 3
The Supreme Court established the assignment-of-income doc-
trine in its landmark decision, Lucas v. Earl.34 There, an attorney
contracted with his wife that any property or earnings either spouse
acquired during their marriage would be joint property.3 5 Conse-
quently, the husband reported only half of his earnings on his tax
return. The Commissioner sought to tax the husband on all the in-
come he earned. 36 The Supreme Court did not challenge the con-
tract's validity, but it nonetheless agreed with the Commissioner's
treatment.37 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, stated that the
income should be taxed to the individual who "earned" it, emphasiz-
ing that "the fruits [should not be] . . .attributed to a different tree
from that on which they grew."'38 In other words, the "true" earner
must recognize all the income that he earns.
The Commissioner first wielded the assignment-of-income doc-
trine against a personal service corporation in Fox v. Commissioner.39
The Board of Tax Appeals, however, rejected the Commissioner's
contention. In Fox, the taxpayer had assigned contracts to the corpo-
ration and the Board treated this assignment like the assignment of
taxpayers, based on the assignment-of-income doctrine. Id. at 381. Judge Tannenwald, con-
curring, pointed out that a "sham" corporation was involved. He emphasized that a corpora-
tion must be given substance and that "the petitioners here did not put flesh on the bones of
the corporate skeleton." Id. at 382 (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
32 Under our graduated income tax system, tax rates increase progressively as taxable
income increases. If a person is allowed to "split" his income, the graduated tax system is
undermined. For example, the tax liability of a single taxpayer with $100,000 taxable income
($41,318 for the 1982 taxable year) will be much greater than the combined tax liabilities of
five single taxpayers, each of whom has $20,000 taxable income ($18,800 for the 1982 taxable
year). Thus, the Commissioner prefers to tax the employee-owner on all of the income in-
volved rather than "split" the income between the corporation and the individual. The Sec-
ond Circuit, in Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970)(Rubin II) recognized
these conflicting policies. See notes 49-53 infra and accompanying text.
33 Corporations can be formed only pursuant to state statutes, and should thus receive
the protections of the state laws. These protections include recognition as separate and legal
entities. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 415-1 to -18 (Professional Service Corporation
Act, P.A. 76-1283)(1979 & Supp. 1980).
34 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
35 Id. at 113-14.
36 Id. at 113.
37 Id. at 114.
38 Id. at 115.
39 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938). See notes 11, 13, 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
[February 19831
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any other income-producing property.40 The Board explained that,
once the taxpayer transferred the income-producing property, the
Commissioner could no longer tax the assignor on the income that
the property subsequently produced. 41 In Fox, the contracts repre-
sented income-producing property; therefore, the corporation was
the "true" earner of any income arising from these contracts after it
acquired them.42 Thus, the Board concluded that there was no as-
signment of future earnings as was present in Lucas v. Earl.43
In Rubin v. Commissioner (Rubin I),4 the Commissioner again used
the assignment-of-income doctrine against a personal service corpo-
ration; this time, the United States Tax Court held for the Commis-
sioner. In Rubin, the taxpayer formed a personal service corporation
to do business with another corporation. The taxpayer held interests
in both corporations45 and did not work exclusively for his personal
service corporation.46 The Tax Court stated that the decision in an
assignment-of-income case turns upon who controls the earning of
the income.47 According to the court, the taxpayer controlled the
income because he controlled both the personal service corporation
and the "serviced" corporation. 48
On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision and remanded the
case for consideration of the issue, using section 482 (Rubin II) .49
Judge Friendly, writing for the court, stated that common law doc-
trines of taxation may occassionally be useful in considering tax
avoidance transactions which cannot be satisfactorily handled in
other ways. However, he reasoned these doctrines should not be used
when a statutory provision can adequately deal with the problem. 50
40 37 B.T.A. at 278.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
44 51 T.C. 251 (1968)(Rubin I), reod and remanded, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970)(Rubin II),
opinion on remand, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971)(Rubin III), afd per curai, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir.
1972)(Rubin IV).
45 The taxpayer owned 70% of the personal service corporation's stock and had voting
control of the "serviced" corporation. 51 T.C. at 255. The "serviced" corporation is the
corporation for which the personal service corporation performed services. In Rubin, there
was only one "serviced" corporation. See notes 109-10 infra and accompanying text.
46 Apparently, the taxpayer had no employment agreement with the personal service
corporation. The taxpayer was also vice-president of a corporation formed by his father. The
"serviced" corporation was a customer of this latter corporation. 51 T.C. at 252-53.
47 Id. at 264-65.
48 Id. at 266.
49 429 F.2d at 654. Section 482 is discussed at Part II infra.
50 429 F.2d at 653.
NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The court stated that section 482 was "clearly superior to the blunt
tools used by the Tax Court."'5' According to the Second Circuit,
section 482 was superior for two reasons. First, section 482 addressed
the issues more clearly, avoiding the conflict between the two major
policies-graduated taxation and the corporation as a separate en-
tity-raised by the assignment-of-income. 52 Second, section 482 pro-
vided relief not found in the assignment-of-income doctrine's all-or-
nothing approach. 53
Other courts have refused to use the common law assignment-of-
income doctrine in situations where section 482 more readily ap-
plies.54 Even though the courts have stripped the assignment-of-in-
come doctrine of some of its effectiveness, the Commissioner still uses
the doctrine in certain situations.55
II. Reallocation Under Internal Revenue Code Section 482
A. Statuto,7 Requirements
The Commissioner's most powerful weapon to attack personal
service corporations is section 482.56 Three basic requirements must
51 Id.
52 Id. According to the court, § 482 analyzed the facts in light of the competing policies
of graduating the income tax system and recognizing the corporation as a separate entity.
Because § 482 takes these competing policies into account, the Second Circuit noted that the
section was superior to the assignment-of-income doctrine in the situation presented. See
notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
53 429 F.2d at 653-54. Under § 482, if the Commissioner allocates income from the per-
sonal service corporation to the taxpayer, the taxpayer receives this income from the corpora-
tion without incurring further personal tax liability. This remedy is unavailable under the
assignment-of-income doctrine; thus, double taxation results (assuming that the personal serv-
ice corporation has not elected Subchapter "S" treatment).
54 In Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980)(Foglesong II), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court's holding, which was
based on the assignment-of-income doctrine, and remanded the case for redetermination us-
ing § 482. See notes 88-96 infra and accompanying text.
55 In Fog/esong IV, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court to determine
if
assignment-of-income principles may be employed to allocate the dividends and
preferred stock received by Foglesong's children to Foglesong as well as commission
income earned by Foglesong before incorporation but paid to the company after
incorporation.
691 F.2d at 853. Both these items will undoubtedly be allocated to Foglesong. The preferred
stock dividends amounted to approximately $38,000. It appears that Foglesong, rather than
his children, paid the $400 preferred stock purchase price. In addition, any commissions
earned prior to incorporation should properly be allocated to Foglesong. See notes 99-101
infra and accompanying text.
56 I.R.C. § 482 (1976) provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
[February 1983]
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be met before section 482 applies: (1) two or more organizations,
trades, or businesses must be involved; (2) these organizations, trades,
or businesses must be commonly controlled; and (3) the Commis-
sioner's allocation of income or deductions must be necessary to pre-
vent tax evasion or to clearly reflect income.5 7
If these three requirements are met, the Commissioner can allo-
cate income and deductions among the taxpayers to clearly reflect
income. The Commissioner's allocation, however, is subject to a
"substantially equivalent" or "arm's-length" test,58 which attempts
to compare the employee-owner's compensation from the corpora-
tion with his probable compensation had the corporation not existed.
If this test is met, a court will disallow the Commissioner's allocation,
even if section 482's first three requirements were met.59
While section 482's second and third requirements generally
present no definitional problems, the approach for evaluating the
first requirement remains unsettled. Courts differ over whether the
Commissioner can treat the employee-owner and his service corpora-
tion as two distinct organizations or businesses.
The dual business requirement is met when the employee-owner
fails to work exclusively for his personal service corporation. In
Rubin,60 the taxpayer fit this requirement by working for both his
personal service corporation and a corporation that his father had
founded.61 After the Second Circuit rejected the Commissioner's use
of the common law doctrines, the Tax Court reheard the case using
section 482 (Rubin II1)62 and concluded that section 482 applied. The
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Sec-
retary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or
allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he deter-
mines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organiza-
tions, trades, or businesses.
57 Id.
58 Under the "substantially equivalent" or "arm's-length" test, a court will uphold the
Commissioner's allocation if the employee-owner's compensation package from the corpora-
tion is less than what he would have received absent incorporation. Conversely, the Commis-
sioner's allocation will be invalid if the employee-owner's compensation package from the
corporation is substantially equivalent to what he would have received absent incorporation.
The employee-owner's salary and employment benefits such as pension plan contributions
will be combined to determine the amount of the compensation package. Se Pacella v. Com-
missioner, 78 T.C. 604 (1982).
59 See I.R.C. § 482 (1976); note 58 supra and accompanying text.
60 See notes 44-53 supra and accompanying text.
61 See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
62 56 T.C. at 1162.
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Tax Court thus held against the taxpayer.
The Tax Court in Rubin III relied principally on Ach v. Commis-
sioner63 and Borge v. Commissioner64 when it analyzed the dual business
requirement. In Ach, the taxpayer sold her dress business to her son's
corporation.65 Although she became the corporation's president and
chairman of the board, the taxpayer worked voluntarily and received
no compensation. 66 The Tax Court, finding that section 482's three
requirements had been met, held that section 482 applied. The cru-
cial issue was whether the taxpayer and the corporation fell within
the dual business requirement. The court explained that the tax-
payer had continued to be a "separate" business, despite having sold
the dress business assets to the corporation.6 7 The court likewise
found that the other two requirements had been met.
The court in Rubin III also relied on Borge v. Commissioner .6  In
Borge, the taxpayer channeled income he earned as an entertainer
into the personal service corporation he had established with the as-
sets of his unprofitable poultry business.69 The Second Circuit de-
cided that section 482 applied. The court found that the dual
business requirement had been met because Borge was involved in
the entertainment business and his corporation was involved in the
poultry business. 70
After Ach, Borge and Rubin III, it appeared that the Tax Court
was expanding its interpretation of the dual business requirement.
This trend continued in Keller v. Commissioner.71 There, a pathologist
formed a personal service corporation and contracted to work exclu-
63 42 T.C. 114 (1964), afd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
64 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969).
65 42 T.C. at 118-19.
66 Id. 115-19. The taxpayer had conducted a highly profitable dress business for several
years, while her son owned a controlling interest in a consistently unprofitable dairy business.
The son changed the name of his corporation and made the taxpayer the president, treasurer,
and chairman of the board. Simultaneously, the taxpayer sold all of the dress business assets
to the son's corporation. The taxpayer did not contract to work exclusively for this corpora-
tion, but voluntarily rendered her services, receiving no compensation.
67 Id. at 124. The court noted that sufficient aspects of the dress business had remained
with the taxpayer; thus, she remained a "separate" business or organization for § 482 pur-
poses. Id. at 125.
68 405 F.2d 673 (1968).
69 According to the court, Borge did not devote his time and energies to the corporation;
he conducted his career as an entertainer and merely channeled a part of his income through
the corporation. Id. at 676.
70 Id.
71 77 T.C. 1014 (1981). In Keller, the partnership involved was comprised of several per-
sonal service corporations. This is a very popular business arrangement that § 269A will
foreclose. See note 109 infra and accompanying text.
[February 1983]
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sively for it. The personal service corporation then contracted to pro-
vide pathological services to a partnership. The Commissioner
attacked this arrangement, again using section 482.72
Although the Tax Court decided that section 482 applied, the
court disallowed the Commissioner's allocation because the substan-
tially equivalent test had also been met.73 The Tax Court noted that
section 482 applied to one-man personal service corporations, even
when the taxpayer worked exclusively for his corporation. 74 The
court added that the dual business requirement should be interpreted
broadly.75 The court therefore believed this situtation met the dual
business requirement simply because the personal service corporation
was in the business of providing services and the taxpayer was in the
business of providing his exclusive services to the personal service cor-
poration. 76 However, since Keller had received compensation that
was substantially equivalent to what he would have received had he
not incorporated, 77 the Tax Court ultimately found in the taxpayer's
favor.
These broad interpretations of section 482's dual business re-
quirement appeared to foreshadow the personal service corporation's
extinction. If the courts continued to interpret section 482 broadly,
then many advantages of the corporate form would be extin-
guished.78 But, on October 29, 1982, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit decided Foglesong IV.79 This important
decision may provide a refuge for many personal service
corporations.
B. The Foglesong Cases: Are One-Man Personal Service Corporations
Safe at Last?
The Foglesong cases8° parallel the Commissioner's attempts to tax
72 Id. at 1021.
73 Id. at 1027-28.
74 Id. at 1022.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1023-24.
77 Id. at 1028. In computing Keller's total compensation, the Tax Court added the sal-
ary that the personal service corporation paid, the pension plan contributions it made, and
medical expense reimbursements it paid.
78 See note 115 infra and accompanying text.
79 Foglesong v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
80 Foglesong v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976) (Fogesong I), reo'd and re-
manded, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980) (Foglesong II), opinion on remand, 77 T.C. 1102 (1981)(Fogle-
song III), reo'd and remanded, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982) (Foglesong IV).
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individuals maintaining personal service corporations.8 ' In Foglesong,
the taxpayer was a sales representative for two corporations.8 2 To
obtain corporate advantages, Foglesong formed a personal service
corporation. 3 Foglesong worked exclusively for this personal service
corporation, although no employment contract obligated him to do
so.8 4 When Foglesong refused to pay tax deficiency notices, the Com-
missioner brought the case before the Tax Court (Foglesong I).85 Cit-
ing the assignment-of-income doctrine, the Commissioner contended
that he should be permitted to allocate the personal service corpora-
tion's income to Foglesong.8 6 The Tax Court agreed with the
Commissioner.8 7
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Tax Court's reason-
ing (Foglesong I).88 The court in Foglesong II noted that the assign-
ment-of-income result was essentially equivalent to the sham
corporation result. 89 Neither doctrine applied to the Foglesong case,
however, since the personal service corporation involved was a via-
ble, taxable entity.90 The Seventh Circuit distinguished Lucas v.
Earl,9 and concluded that no assignment of income took place since
Foglesong had assigned no future earnings.92 The court held that Fox
v. Commissioner93 was indistinguishable-because the assignment-of-
81 The Foglesong cases exemplify the Commissioner's attempts to use the sham corpora-
tion argument, the assignment-of-income doctrine, and § 482 against personal service corpo-
rations. In Foglesong I, the Commissioner, conceding this was not a sham corporation, used
the assignment-of-income doctrine. The Foglesong II court rejected this doctrine. In Foglesong
III, the Commissioner attempted to use § 482, but the Fogesong IV court rejected this
argument.
82 See text accompanying note 111 infra.
83 Foglesong incorporated for limited liability and business diversification reasons. See
621 F.2d at 866-67.
84 Foglesong executed no formal employment contract with his personal service corpora-
tion, but he worked exclusively for his corporation. Id. at 867. However, the courts will focus
on what actually occurred; therefore, an employment contract requiring the employee-own-
er's exclusive services will be disregarded if the individual does not actually work for his
corporation.
85 35 T.C.M. (OCH) 1309 (1976).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980).
89 Id. at 869. The Seventh Circuit said that it was inappropriate "to achieve, through
recourse to the assignment-of-income doctrine, essentially the same result as would follow
from treating the Corporation as a 'sham' for tax purposes." Theoretically, however, the
assignment-of-income and sham corporation doctrines remain distinct. See text accompany-
ing notes 8-9 supra.
90 621 F.2d at 869.
91 See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
92 621 F.2d at 870.
93 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938); See notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text.
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income doctrine did not apply in Fox, it should likewise not apply to
Foglesong.9 4
The court concluded by adding that there were "more precise
devices for coping with the unacceptable tax avoidance which is un-
questionably present in this case." 95 The court indicated that section
482 was one of these more precise devices. 96 The court therefore re-
versed and remanded the case for redetermination using section 482.
On remand, the Tax Court reexamined the case under section
482 (Fog/esong III).97 The Tax Court found for the Commissioner,
concluding that section 482 applied. The court relied on its previous
analysis of the dual business requirement issue in Keller.98
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit again concluded that section
482 did not apply, because the dual business requirement had not
been met (Foglesong IV).99 The court believed that section 482 could
not be properly applied to an individual who worked exclusively for
his personal service corporation. 100 The Seventh Circuit thus dis-
agreed with the Tax Court's expansive interpretation of section 482.
The Seventh Circuit noted that Foglesong had worked exclusively for
his corporation and had not attempted to offset one business's losses
against another's profits. 10 1
Thus, it appears that Foglesong IV has provided a refuge for one-
man personal service corporations, at least in the Seventh Circuit.
To fall within this refuge, however, the taxpayer must carefully con-
sider the following guidelines:
(a) The taxpayer must establish that his personal service corpo-
ration is a viable, taxable entity. The personal service corporation
must follow all corporate formalities to ensure the separateness
needed to avoid the sham corporation doctrine.
(b) The taxpayer must work exclusively for his personal service
corporation. The taxpayer is advised to sign a contract with the cor-
poration evidencing this intention.
(c) The taxpayer should not use the personal service corporation
income to offset the losses of another corporation.
94 621 F.2d at 870.
95 Id. at 872. The court noted that there was "no need to crack walnuts with a sledge-
hammer." Id.
96 Id.
97 77 T.C. 1102 (1981).
98 Id. at 1104. See notes 71-77 sufra and accompanying text for a discussion of Keller.
99 691 F.2d at 851.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 852-53. In Ach and Borge, the taxpayers had attempted to offset losses of one
business with another business's profits. See notes 63-70 supra and accompanying text.
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(d) The taxpayer must take precautions to avoid Code section
269A.O 2
III. New Developments- Section 269A
Even after Foglesong IV, one-man personal service corporations
may still encounter difficulties. According to the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982103 (TEFRA), any personal service
corporation formed or used to avoid or evade income taxes will be
subject to Code section 269A. 0 4 This new Code section applies to all
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1982.105
Under section 269A, the Secretary has the power to allocate in-
come between the personal service corporation and its employee-
owners if necessary to prevent income tax evasion or avoidance, or to
clearly reflect income.'0 6 Section 269A applies to any personal serv-
ice corporation that (a) performs substantially all of its services for
one other entity; 0 7 and (b) was formed principally to avoid or evade
income taxes.108
Thus, section 269A would have applied to a case such as Rubin v.
Commissioner.109 Recall that in Rubin, the taxpayer's personal service
102 See Part III infra.
103 Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 250, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs (96 Stat.) 3 (to be
codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The key question after TEFRA takes effect will
be the reason the corporation was formed, not whether it was a truly separate entity.
104 I.R.C. § 269A (West Supp. 1982) provides:
. (a) GENERAL RULE-If-(l) substantially all of the services of a personal
service corporation are performed for (or on behalf of) one other corporation, part-
nership, or other entity, and (2) the principal purpose for forming, or availing of,
such personal service corporation is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax
by reducing the income of, or securing the benefit of any expense, deduction, credit,
exclusion, or other allowance for, any employee-owner which would not otherwise
be available, then the Secretary may allocate all income, deductions, credits, exclu-
sions, and other allowances between such personal service corporation and its em-
ployee-owners, if such allocation is necessary to prevent avoidance or evasion of
Federal income tax or clearly to reflect the income of the personal service corpora-
tion or any of its employee-owners.
(b) DEFINITIONS
(1) Personal service corporation-The term "personal service corporation"
means a corporation the principal activity of which is the performance of personal
services and such services are substantially performed by employee-owners.
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE- The amendments made by this section shall apply
to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1982.
105 I.R.C. § 269A (c) (West Supp. 1982).
106 I.R.C. § 269A (a) (West Supp. 1982).
107 I.R.C. § 269A (a)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
108 I.R.C. § 269A (a)(2) (West Supp. 1982).
109 See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text. It is important to note that § 269A was
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corporation performed services for only one corporation.'10 On the
other hand, Foglesong would have escaped liability under section
269A, because his personal service corporation performed services
for, or on behalf of, two corporations. 1'
How the judiciary will interpret section 269A's requirement,
that substantially all the services be performed for one entity," 2 is
open to speculation. A personal service corporation providing 90% of
its services to one corporation and 10% to another corporation might
fall within section 269A. A taxpayer must keep this in mind when
forming a personal service corporation. If the personal service corpo-
ration legitimately performs services for two or more corporations,
then section 269A should present no problems. However, if the tax-
payer performs "token" services for another corporation only in an
attempt to escape section 269A, a court will likely recognize this
scheme and take measures to prevent it.
IV. Evaluation of the Judicial Approach
Have the pre-Foglesong IV courts deciding section 482 controver-
sies exceeded their judicial authority? This question must be an-
swered affirmatively. The courts have unnecessarily expanded
section 482 beyond its practical limitations.
The courts have expanded the dual business requirement to in-
clude employee-owners working exclusively for their personal service
corporations. 13 In doing so, the courts have allowed many legiti-
mate personal service corporations to fall prey to the Commissioner's
section 482 power to allocate income."14 Undeniably, the Commis-
sioner's power under a Keller-type interpretation of section 482's dual
business requirement is nearly absolute." 5 Of course, the Commis-
sioner's allocation is subject to the "substantially equivalent" or
passed in order to overturn the result reached in cases like Keller v. Commissioner "where the
corporation served no meaningful business purpose other than to secure tax benefits which
would not otherwise be available." H.R. REP. No. 76, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 634 (1982). Con-
gress wanted to eliminate personal service corporation partnerships. See note 71 supra.
110 See note 45 supra.
111 See text accompanying note 82 supra.
112 See note 104 supra.
113 See notes 71-77 supra and accompanying text.
114 Had the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in Fogesong IV, this would have
constituted a prime example of a legitimate corporation becoming a victim of the courts'
expansive interpretation of § 482's dual business requirement.
115 Personal service corporations would have been annihilated under under a Xeller-type
interpretation of the dual business requirement. The Commissioner would have indirectly
been able to eliminate many personal service corporations by directly eliminating the corpo-
ration's identity for tax purposes. See note 117 infra.
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"arm's-length" test,116 but this check on the Commissioner will often
be unavailable to the taxpayer. 117
The Foglesong IV court is the first court, and hopefully not the
last, to realize the practical consequences of overextending the dual
business requirement. 1 8 The Seventh Circuit has successfully bal-
anced the policy behind section 482 (preventing income splitting)19
with the policy of recognizing corporations as separate, legal
entities. 12
0
Other courts have permitted the Commissioner to invoke section
482 in situations not intended for its use.' 2' In addition, Congress
has now added section 269A to the Commissioner's arsenal for at-
tacking personal service corporations. 22 This new Code section will
undoubtedly prove invaluable to the Commissioner since countless
personal service corporations will fall within section 269A's
parameters.
Considering these developments, the courts should not expand
section 482 to a Keller extreme. The Foglesong IV court must have
considered 23 these arguments before giving section 482 a fair inter-
pretation. Foglesong IV provides a fair interpretation of section 482's
dual business requirement; it is an interpretation that many personal
service corporations can "live" with.
V. Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit has established a refuge for one-man per-
sonal service corporations in Foglesong IV. The other circuits should
116 See note 58 supra.
117 The "substantially equivalent" or "arm's-length" test will be more difficult to meet
after TEFRA because TEFRA has eliminated the advantages of corporate pension plans.
Because the allowable pension plan contributions have been decreased, the employee-owner's
compensation package will be less. See TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 235-36, 238, 240,
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (96 Stat.) 3.
118 See notes 114-15, 117supra.
119 The court stated that "section [482] was intended to apply to cases where the profits of
one business have been offset against the losses of another to reduce or escape tax liability."
691 F.2d at 850.
120 Id. at 851.
121 Section 482 should not apply in cases where the taxpayer makes no attempt to offset
the losses of one business with the profits of another. Nor should § 482 apply where the
taxpayer works exclusively for his personal service corporation. Therefore, § 482 should not
have applied to cases like Keller and Foglesong. See notes 71-77, 99-100 supra and accompany-
ing text.
122 See Part III supra.
123 691 F.2d at 852. The court emphasized the fact that Foglesong had worked exclu-
sively for his corporation and that he had made no attempt to offset the losses of another
business against his corporation's profits.
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follow the Seventh Circuit's lead. The Seventh Circuit has wisely
realized the drastic effects that the Tax Court's expansive interpreta-
tion of section 482 would have upon personal service corporations. 24
By continuing to broadly interpret section 482, the courts would ex-
tinguish many personal service corporations. Such a change should
come only from Congress, and the Foglesong IV court was quick to
realize this.
One-man personal service corporations have waged an ongoing
war with the Commissioner since their inception. After Foglesong IV,
the Commissioner should have called a cease fire to the war on per-
sonal service corporations. Unfortunately, the Commissioner will
probably rebuild his forces and initiate a new offensive, using section
269A as his primary weapon. The Commissioner, like a modern-day
mercenary, will continue to fight any war as long as money is at
stake. For many one-man personal service corporations the battle is
over, but for others it is only beginning.1 25
Aguinaldo Valdez
124 See note 115 supra.
125 Aside from § 482 and § 269A, personal service corporations may become extinct be-
cause Congress has eliminated many of their corporate advantages. Corporate pension plans
are no longer more attractive than individual pension plans. See TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§§ 235-36, 238, 240, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (96 Stat.) 3.
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